Este livro é o resultado de três anos de debates entre estudiosos interessados em entender o modo como diferentes dimensões da vida podem ser lidas sob a perspectiva da moral. Afinal, embora este tenha sido sempre um tema importante para a sociologia e a antropologia, raros têm sido os esforços brasileiros para a realização de pesquisas empíricas nessa área. Considerando essa lacuna, os autores dos 22 ensaios que fazem parte de Pensando bem se concentram na discussão prática da moral tomada (...) do nosso cotidiano, privilegiando formas de ultrapassar a dicotomia entre abordagens preocupadas com o correto ou justo, de um lado, e aquelas preocupadas com o bom, de outro. (shrink)

Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.

O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento de Sexto Empírico, (...) René Descartes, e David Hume, eu vou extrair e identificar claramente as teses centrais que marcam as suas ideias. A minha intenção, porém, não é a de sugerir que as suas teses são auto-evidentes, ou incontestáveis, ou até hoje ainda incontestadas. Muito pelo contrário. A minha intenção é produzir um aperitivo ao debate e um convite a discussão. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

Neste artigo, nosso objetivo é desenvolver o seguinte questionamento: Na relação entre professor e aluno em sala de aula, é possível, através do reconhecimento mútuo, romper com o princípio da desigualdade das inteligências, que produz o embrutecimento, em prol de uma educação para a emancipação? De início, principalmente, a partir de Judith Butler, descrevemos o processo de reconhecimento mútuo e buscamos mostrar que, tanto nas relações entre professor e aluno como em outras possíveis conjunturas, o reconhecimento mútuo ocorre mediante determinadas (...) normas que condicionam os modos de reconhecimento. Em seguida, com Jacques Rancière, focamos o princípio da desigualdade das inteligências que, de acordo com o filósofo franco-argelino, se faz presente como verdade inquestionável ou crença inabalável na relação entre mestre e aprendiz. Situada dentro do enquadramento da desigualdade das inteligências, a relação entre professor e aluno se configura em duplas polarizadas, de modo que temos, de um lado, o professor posto como sábio, sujeito ativo, explicador e capaz de usar sua própria inteligência; e, do outro, o aluno tido como ignorante, espectador passivo, incapaz de aprender por si mesmo e sempre dependente do mestre explicador. Em tais termos, o reconhecimento mútuo entre eles se torna impossível. Por fim, postulamos, ainda, a partir de Rancière, o princípio da igualdade das inteligências e ensaiamos a possibilidade de ruptura com o princípio da desigualdade das inteligências, em prol de uma educação comprometida, não com o embrutecimento e a submissão da inteligência do aprendiz àquele mestre, mas com a emancipação de ambos, compreendidos, daí por diante, como interatores, iguais em inteligência na sala de aula. Palavras-chave: Reconhecimento. Enquadramento. Embrutecimento. Emancipação. (shrink)

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

This article analyzes clerics who identified with the ethics of bravery. Bravery is an evaluative field based on the public display of courage and skill in the management of violence. In this sense, it was observed that among the Catholic clergy, a minority contingent, but heuristically representative, held typical actions of brave people, like the courage to kill another human being, or to use violence to solve everyday conflicts. The text is divided into three parts: the first, called "Catholic Church (...) and violence," says, from the Weberian sociology, the strained relations between religion and violence. In the second, "the courage and the clerics" looking conceptualize courage and demonstrate their applicability to members of the clergy from historical examples. Finally, the topic called "brave priests in Goiás" studies the cases of priests in the context of Goiás history, before 1930, which approached the bravery of ethics, taking on a personality that clashes with the socially expected behavior for this category. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and (...) Peter van Inwagen). (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...) epistemology. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

As a compact representation of joint probability distributions over a dependence graph of random variables, and a tool for modelling and reasoning in the presence of uncertainty, Bayesian networks are of great importance for artificial intelligence to combine domain knowledge, capture causal relationships, or learn from incomplete datasets. Known as a NP-hard problem in a classical setting, Bayesian inference pops up as a class of algorithms worth to explore in a quantum framework. This paper explores such a research direction and (...) improves on previous proposals by a judicious use of the utility function in an entangled configuration. It proposes a completely quantum mechanical decision-making process with a proven computational advantage. A prototype implementation in Qiskit (a Python-based program development kit for the IBM Q machine) is discussed as a proof-of-concept. (shrink)

Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, (...) and some of the alleged connections between agency and justification. (shrink)

The notion of normal proof theory, and yet it has been somewhat neglected by the systems of equational logic. The intention here is then to show the normalization procedure for the equational logic of the Labelled Natural Deduction system . With this we believe we are making a step towards filling a gap in the literature on equational logic. Besides presenting a normalization procedure for the LND equational fragment, we employ a new method to prove the normalization theorems for equational (...) logic: proof transformation by rewriting, based on a algebraic calculus on the 'rewrite reasons'. (shrink)

Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, born of a penchant (...) for so-called Quinean desert landscapes, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. This volume honors Baker’s work by bringing together 16 critical essays by some of her students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. The essays fall into four areas, each an area to which Baker made unique and influential contributions: Practical Realism about the Mind, The Constitution View of Human Persons, The First Person Perspective, and God, Christianity and Naturalism. (shrink)

Externalism About Knowledge presents new essays from leading epistemologists working in various branches of this tradition: process reliabilism, tracking views, safety views, virtue epistemology, proper functionalism, naturalized epistemology, and knowledge-first epistemology.

We propose a simple situation in which the magnetic Aharonov–Bohm potential influences the values of the deficiency indices of the initial Schrödinger operator, so determining whether the particle interacts with the solenoid or not. Even with the particle excluded from the magnetic field, the number of self-adjoint extensions of the initial Hamiltonian depends on the magnetic flux. This is a new point of view of the Aharonov–Bohm effect.

Pretende-se nesse trabalho analisar a crítica do filósofo judeu-alemão Hans Jonas à ideia de progresso e sua perspectiva prática, a ideia de desenvolvimento. Tal perspectiva, segundo o autor, surge de uma mudança no status do saber na era moderna, o que significa reconhecer que a ciência moderna será colocada a serviço dessa ideia. O avanço da problemática ambiental, contudo, exige uma reavaliação ética de tal cenário, fazendo com que a simples utopia do desenvolvimento seja substituída por medidas de prevenção, antecipação (...) dos efeitos negativos e até mesmo por freios voluntários. A política, assim, deve reorientar a ciência em nome de um novo papel: não apenas analisar o fato ocorrido, mas prevê-lo e, quiçá, contribuir para evita-lo. (shrink)

Researchers and other professionals unanimously agree that companies should become more sustainable, but this will not happen without the support of human resource management. Paradoxically, there is a lack of information on the support human resource management offers to organizational sustainability applied to real cases. Therefore, this research presents a case study on this topic that was carried out in a leading Brazilian company, which is considered as a model and has been selected as ‘the best place to work in (...) the country’. The results provide practical examples of how this family company has been working to guarantee an increasingly sustainable performance with the support of human resources, highlighting the achievements and challenges the company has faced. One of the main results indicates that companies seeking to achieve sustainability need the assistance of the human resource field in order to design a communication system which bridges the gap between practices and sustainable values. (shrink)

The discussion about the concept of enlightenment runs through the conception of Immanuel Kant, who thematized it as an exit from the individual from his condition of intellectual minority and guardianship of those who prevent the exercise of thinking for himself, impelling the achievement of autonomy that requires freedom and to make public use of reason. Such problematization about the difficulties interposed to the process of enlightenment can be related to the problem of estrangement in Marx, making the necessary considerations (...) in relation to the historical and social context of both philosophers. In this way, through philosophical investigation, it is possible to establish correlations of complementarities, differences and counterpoints between the different conceptions of Kant and Marx. Thus, we realize that the search for enlightenment depends on overcoming the material determinations of the set of alienations produced by the capitalist mode of production, aiming at the achievement of human emancipation understood as effective autonomous freedom. (shrink)

O trabalho analisa as principais dificuldades na construção de parâmetros Tecnoéticos da atualidade. A hipótese aqui reside em determinar a constante que atravessa a Singularidade Tecnológica, a Convergência NBIC e a Inteligência Coletiva como variável integrativa e constitutiva da Tecnoética para fins de análise paradigmática sob a Teoria da Integridade de Dworkin. Assim, alicerçado no método lógico-dedutivo-dogmático, este artigo se baseia em incursões históricas e conceitos doutrinários para demonstrar a existência da constante em questão e, por fim, motivar sua adoção.

The geometric system of deduction called N-Graphs was introduced by de Oliveira in 2001. The proofs in this system are represented by means of digraphs and, while its derivations are mostly based on Gentzen's sequent calculus, the system gets its inspiration from geometrically based systems, such as the Kneales' tables of development, Statman's proofs-as-graphs, Buss' logical flow graphs, and Girard's proof-nets. Given that all these geometric systems appeal to the classical symmetry between premises and conclusions, providing an intuitionistic version (...) of any of these is an interesting exercise in extending the range of applicability of the geometric system in question. In this article we produce an intuitionistic version of N-Graphs, based on Maehara's LJ' system, as described by Takeuti. Recall that LJ' has multiple conclusions in all but the essential intuitionistic rules, e.g., implication right and negation right. We show soundness and completeness of our intuitionistic N-Graphs with respect to LJ'. We also discuss how we expect to extend this work to a version of N-Graphs corresponding to the intuitionistic logic system FIL (Full Intuitionistic Logic) of de Paiva and Pereira and sketch future developments. (shrink)

Competitive sports involve physiological, technical and psychological skills, which influence directly on individuals’ performance. This study aims to investigate the levels of perceived stress and Heart Rate Variability before and after matches with victory and defeat in professional eSports athletes. Our hypothesis was that the winners would have better autonomic and stress responses after match, thus corroborating the literature on neurocardiac connections. Fifty male eSport players were selected players from 10 different Brazilian teams. The experiment was carried out in 2 (...) sessions. Firstly, after signing the informed consent form, 24 h before the game, anthropometric, physical activity levels and time of expertise data were recorded only for sample characterization and the players were familiarized with the perceived stress scale—10 and the HRV measurements. Secondly, players performed the PSS-10 and HRV recording at rest by 10 min 60 and 30 min before the game and 10 min after the end of the game. Overall, concerning PSS-10 our findings show that VG had significant reduced scores in post-game time compared to baseline and pre-game times, while DG had significant increased scores in post-game time compared to BL and pre-game times. Regarding HRV, our results demonstrate that VG had significant increase in RR, SDNN, rMSSD, pNN50 and HF, and significant decrease in LF and LF/HF, while DG had a significant decrease in RR, SDNN, rMSSD and HF, and significant increase in LF and LF/HF. It was observed that VG had better HRV responses as well as lower levels of perceived stress, while DG had worst HRV responses and higher levels of perceived stress. (shrink)

Quelle est la tâche – plutôt que la contribution – de la philosophie à l’égard du langage? Dans cet article, il s’agit de revisiter la réponse de Paul Ricœur à cette question, à partir de son texte “Philosophie et langage.” Ricœur assigne à la philosophie la tâche de se réapproprier la triple médiation langagière: “chemin” du langage vers monde, “chemin” du langage vers le sujet et “chemin” du langage vers la communauté humaine. Partant de l’expérience concrète des sujets parlants, Ricœur (...) s’oppose à la clôture systémique présupposée par la conception structuraliste du langage, qui suspend la fonction de la référence dans la relation de signification. À partir d’une conception élargie de la référence – qui inclut la fonction poétique du langage –, le philosophe dégage de la notion de “monde du texte” la dimension ontologique constitutive du langage: dans sa fonction poétique, en effet, le langage révèle, selon lui, les possibilités multiples de notre mode d’existence. Nous montrons enfin que c’est à travers la notion d’attestation que Ricœur établit une connexion entre la réouverture de la triple médiation du langage et l’élaboration de cette nouvelle ontologie. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo compreender o arquipélago da libertação como umas das chaves de leituras das filosofias negro africanas, neste caso específico, com o recorte da filosofia do moçambicano Severino Elias Ngoenha, desde a leitura do “Paradigma liberdade” em diálogo com a perspectiva do pensamento do arquipélago em diálogo com o martinicano Édouard Glissant. Palavras chave: Filosofias negro africanas; Arquipélago da libertação; Paradigma liberdade; Paisagem.